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Note
Apparent Authority in Antitrust Law and Ruminations
on a New Antitrust Theory: The Implications of
American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.
INTRODUCTION

The antitrust liability of principals for the unauthorized
and anticompetitive conduct of their agents rests on a seemingly straightforward application of traditional agency theory.
The recent Supreme Court decision in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers,Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.1 declared that a
principal will be subjected to antitrust liability for the unauthorized conduct of an agent acting within its "apparent authority."2 Although this "newly-developed" 3 apparent authority
standard is easily understood and applied, its appropriateness
in antitrust law is questionable. In formulating this standard,
the Hydrolevel majority placed undue emphasis on the need
for a simple and convenient judicial test, without full consideration of the possible implications.
This Note argues that the Hydrolevel standard is overly
simplistic and inappropriate. As an alternative, the Note articulates a comprehensive and systematic test for determining the
antitrust liability of a principal for the unauthorized and anticompetitive conduct of its agents. Section I discusses agency
theory in the common law and its applicability to antitrust law.
Section II describes how courts have applied these agency principles to antitrust law and discusses the recent changes
brought about by the Hydrolevel decision. Section HI critically
analyzes the Supreme Court's injection, in Hydrolevel, of an
1. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
2. Id. at 565-66. The Court defined apparent authority as "the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons,
professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the
other's manifestations to such third persons." Id. at 566 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957)).
3. Hydroleve 456 U.S. at 578 (Powell, J., joined by White and Rehnquist,

JJ., dissenting).
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apparent authority standard of liability into the antitrust law.
Section IV proposes a systematic approach for determining the
antitrust liability of a principal for the unauthorized conduct of
its agent.
I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES: AGENCY THEORY IN THE
COMMON LAW AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE
ANTITRUST LAW

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW CONCERNING THE AuTHORrrY OF AN
AGENT

Under agency theory, a principal is bound by the conduct
of its agent that the principal actually authorized.4 Actual authority refers to the agent's power to act within the scope of the
principal's manifested consent-the power to carry out
whatever the principal has expressly or impliedly engaged the
agent to accomplish.5 Thus, an agent's actual authority may
stem from the principal's express instructions to the agent, or it
may be implied from words or other conduct between the prin6
cipal and the agent.
In addition, a principal is bound by the conduct of its agent
7
undertaken pursuant to apparent authority from the principal.
Apparent authority results when a principal manifests to a
third party that another party is the principal's agent.8 Apparent authority is created as to a third party by written or spoken
words or by any other conduct of the principal that reasonably
causes the third party to believe that the principal consents to
the agent's conduct. 9 Therefore, to bind a principal under apparent authority, the third party dealing with the agent must
prove that the principal created the appearance of authority.O
Although it is now well established that a principal is liable
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1957). For example, the
authority to "sell my automobile" is express as to the conveyance of title, but a
question remains whether there is implied authority to receive a check in payment, or to deliver the car without receiving the price. See id. § 7 comment c.

5. See id. § 7 &comments.
6. See id. See also id. § 26 (actual authority may be impliedly conferred
where the principal's conduct causes the agent to believe that it is acting on the
principal's account); id § 34 (authorization interpreted in light of custom and
usage).
7. Id. § 140(b).
8. See id. § 8.
9. See Grummitt v. Sturgeon Bay Winter Sports Club, 197 F. Supp. 455,
458-59 (E.D. Wis. 1961), affid, 304 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1962); Reynolds Offset Co. v.
Summer, 5 N.J. Super. 542, 558-59, 156 A.2d 737, 746 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 comment a (1957). See also
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for the torts of an agent acting with apparent authority," courts
struggled originally with situations where the agent took advantage of its position to perpetrate a fraud for its own benefit
in violation of its duty to the principal. In such instances, although the agent acted outside the scope of its actual authority,12 it may have acted in the apparent course of employment,
thereby deceiving a third party. Thus, courts were forced to determine which of two innocent parties, the principal or the defrauded third party, should suffer the loss. Originally, the
Supreme Court, in Friedlanderv. Texas & Pacific Railway,13
held that an employer was not liable for the fraud of its agent
where the employer derived no benefit from the agent's conduct.14 The Court, however, later overruled Friedlander in
Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway. 5 In Gleason, an employee sought to enrich himself by defrauding a customer of
the employer through a forged bill of lading. The Court held
that a principal is liable for the fraudulent representations of
an agent acting within the scope of its apparent authority even
though the agent acts with a secret purpose to procure a benefit without the knowledge or consent of the principal.16 The
Court concluded that such a rule was necessary to ensure reasonable protection for third parties who deal with agents.' 7
Nelson v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 163 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1959); Grummit4 197 F. Supp. at 458-59; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1957).
11. See generally W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY §§ 91, 92 (1964) (principal liable for torts made possible by agent's apparent authority as well as for agent's
apparently authorized misrepresentations).
12. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1957) provides: "An act
of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is
employed." The comments to § 235 indicate that intent is the crucial factor. See
id. comment a. See also id. § 282(1); infra note 18 and accompanying text.
13. 130 U.S. 416 (1889).
14. Id. at 426. In Friedlander,a railroad company's station agent issued
bills of lading for fictitious goods. Id. at 423.
15. 278 U.S. 349 (1929).
16. Id. at 352-53, 357.
17. Id. at 356-57. The Court's conclusion is further supported by the third
party's reliance interest in such situations:
A person relying upon the appearance of agency knows that the
apparent agent is not authorized to act except for the benefit of the
principal. This is something, however, which he normally cannot ascertain and something, therefore, for which it is rational to require the
principal... to bear the risk. . .. It is...
for the ultimate interest of
persons employing agents, as well as for the benefit of the public, that
persons dealing with agents should be able to rely upon apparently
true statements by agents who are purporting to act and are apparently
acting in the interests of the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 262 comment a (1957).
Moreover, holding the principal liable may serve to deter similar future
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Despite Gleason's express holding that a principal is liable
for the harm resulting from an agent's unauthorized conduct, in
particular situations courts have refused to impute an agent's
knowledge to a principal, indicating that the application of apparent authority is not an absolute rule.18
As Gleason illustrates, courts have often used the term
"apparent authority" to describe any situation in which a principal is bound by the unauthorized conduct of its agent. Consistent with section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency,19 however, some courts now recognize the "inherent"
power of an agent to subject its principal to liability even absent express, implied, or apparent authority, or elements of estoppel.20 Under the inherent power theory, a principal is bound
by an agent's conduct merely by virtue of the agency relationconduct by encouraging the principal to exercise greater care in selecting
agents. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 577-78 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Duplex Envelope Co. v. Denominational Envelope Co., 80 F.2d
179 (4th Cir. 1935) (defendant not charged with knowledge that agent was using
defendant's premises to infringe plaintiff's patent where agent was acting for
another company). See also W. SEAVEY, supra note 11, § 102(G). Professor
Seavey states that "[t]he clearest case for denying the principal's liability is
that in which there has been collusion between the other party to a transaction
and the agent." Id. Seavey argues that the test should be "whether the defendant has violated a duty to the other party by the conduct of any agent for
whom he was responsible." Id.
19. An agent's "[i]nherent agency power.., is derived not from authority,
apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and exists
for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other
agent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1957). See W. SEAVEY, supra
note 11, § 8(F) (citing cases). See also Watteau v. Fenwick, [18931 1 Q.B. 346,
348-49.
20. Authority by estoppel is actually not an agency theory. Rather, it is an
equitable device employed to prevent a principal who has misled a third party
from profiting thereby. The doctrine is invoked when a principal intentionally
or negligently causes or allows a third party to believe that the principal's
agent has authority to do something that the agent is not actually authorized to
do, and the third party detrimentally relies on the resulting misperception. See,
e.g., Hoddeson v. Koos Bros., 47 N.J. Super. 224, 233, 135 A.2d 702, 707 (1957) (defendant liable for actions of imposter posing as a salesperson in defendant's
furniture store); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (1957).
Authority by estoppel resembles apparent authority to the extent that it is
based on a principal's manifestations to, or withholding of information from,
third parties. Under apparent authority theory, however, both the principal
and the third party are contractually bound. In contrast, under the doctrine of
authority by estoppel only the losses of the third party are protected. The doctrine creates no reciprocal rights in the principal. See id. § 8B comment b.
In most cases this distinction is academic because courts tend to treat
cases of apparent authority and estoppel interchangeably. See W. SEAVEY,
supra note 11, § 8(E). This is particularly true where a principal makes actual
representations to third parties. For a case involving only estoppel, see Metropolitan Club, Inc. v. Hopper, McGaw & Co., 153 Md. 666, 139 A. 554 (1927).
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ship2l because an agent is deemed to possess certain inherent
powers totally independent of any particular grant of authority
from the principal. 22 Inherent powers, which include all powers that a third party would reasonably suppose the agent to
have, are recognized only when necessary to protect third parties with whom the agent has dealt.2 3 Thus, as between an innocent principal and an innocent third party, inherent agency
power theory requires that the loss be borne by the principal,
who allowed the agent to assume authority, even if the agent
flagrantly abused that authority.24 One commentator described
this rule as follows:
[T]he equities of the situation... seem to favor the contracting third
party if [that party] knows of; or has reason to know of, no irregularity
in the [agent's] authority. Although the basic elements of apparent authority may be absent, the [principal] should nonetheless bear the responsibility for placing the particular [agent] in a position where he
could purport to represent the [principal] .25

Courts rarely use the term inherent agency power.2 6 Rather,
they improperly use apparent authority theory to analyze fact
situations that should have been considered under an inherent
agency power theory.27

B. THE APPLIcABILrT

OF COMMON LAw AGENCY THEORY TO

THE ANTITRUST LAw

The general objective of the antitrust law is the maintenance of competition.23 As the language of the Sherman Act
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140(c) (1957); supra note 19.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1957).
23. See id.
24. See id. comment a.
25. Note, Inherent Power as a Basis of a Corporate Officer's Authority to
Contrac4 57 COLUM. L. REv. 868, 886 (1957).

26. Seavey found only two cases in which courts used inherent authority
theory. W. SEAVEY, supra note 11, § 8(F) (citing Cote Bros. v. Granite Lake Realty Corp., 105 N.H. 111, 193 A.2d 884 (1963); Holman-Baker Co. v. Pre-Design,
Inc., 104 N.H. 116, 179 A.2d 454 (1962)). Seavey also noted discussions of inherent authority in the following law review articles: Mearns, Vicarious Liability
for Agency Contracts,48 VA. L. REV. 50 (1962); Note, supra note 25.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A comment b (1957). In
Kidd v. Thomas Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 242 F. 923 (2d Cir.
1917), Judge Learned Hand noted that the term apparent authority may be at
least somewhat misleading in cases in which the party dealing with the agent
relies solely on the agent's statement that the agent's conduct is authorized,
when in fact the conduct is outside the scope of employment. Id. at 407.
28. The first three sections of the Sherman Act contain the substantive
provisions of the antitrust law. The legislative history and case law construing
the Act indicate that maintenance of competition is the primary goal of the antitrust law. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 338
(1963); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Standard Oil Co.
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reveals, 29 Congress designed the Act to encompass all conduct
in restraint of trade. 3 0 The Act sets forth a broad framework for
the achievement of a competitive marketplace and does not
purport to specify the conduct that falls within its reach.3 1 Although Congress could have enacted a more comprehensive
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1911). See also IL THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST PoLIcY 12 (1954); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 783-84 (1965).
29. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is to be
declared illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides
sanctions for three distinct offenses-monopolization, attempted monopolization, and combination or conspiracy to monopolize any part of the interstate or
foreign commerce of the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
30. In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act to remedy certain perceived
weaknesses in the existing law. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 730 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982)) (Clayton Act
adopted "to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies and for other purposes"). See generally S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1914) ("while the Sherman law is the foundation stone of our [antitrust] policy.., additional legislation is necessary"); 1 J. VON KALNowsKI, ANTrrRusT
LAws AND TRADE REGULATON § 2.03(1) (1983) (discussion of factors contributing to view that new legislation was necessary).
As finally enacted, the Clayton Act supplemented the Sherman Act by: (1)
expanding its venue provisions by adding the words "or has an agent," Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982));
(2) allowing final judgments of antitrust violations in government cases to
serve as prima facie evidence of violations in subsequent private actions arising
from the same set of facts, id. § 5, 38 Stat. at 731 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 16 (1982)); and (3) providing for tolling of the statute of limitations in private
actions during the pendency of government actions, id. (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 16(i) (1982)). The Clayton Act also enumerated additional unlawful
acts and practices, e.g., id. § 7, 38 Stat. at 731-32 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1982)), and provided for injunctive relief, e.g., id. § 16, 38 Stat. at 737 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982)). Moreover, the Act clarified Congress's intent that nonprofit labor and agricultural organizations engaged in lawful
activities not be subject to the unlawful combination and conspiracy provisions
of the antitrust law. See id. § 6, 38 Stat. at 731 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1982)).
The Clayton Act provision for treble damages superseded a provision of the
Sherman Act to the same effect. Id. § 4, 38 Stat. at 731 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982)). The language of § 4 of the Clayton Act was drawn directly
from § 7 of the Sherman Act which provided:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
three fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955,
ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283.
31. The Sherman Act does not proscribe specific conduct. Rather, it is
framed in terms of the general harm that Congress sought to prevent. See
supra note 29. In interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has compared its
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and detailed statute, codification of the general rules and principles of the common law presented a more practical solution.
Indeed, much of the Sherman Act's language derives directly
from common law. 32 Courts generally recognize that section 1
of the Sherman Act, because it is essentially an exposition of
common law doctrines of restraint of trade, must be interpreted
33
in light of the common law.
The primary rule of construction in many Sherman Act
cases, the rule of reason,34 is a direct outgrowth of common law
"generality and adaptability... to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
32. For example, the terms "restraint of trade," "attempt to monopolize,"
and "monopolization" derive, at least in their rudimentary meaning, from preSherman Act, Anglo-American common law. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-59 (1911). See also United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Kansas City Chapter Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 82 F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D. Mo. 1949). Senator Sherman noted
that his bill was worded broadly in order to give courts wide latitude to interpret the law so as to avert the evils that Congress sought to prevent. 21 CONG.
REc. 2460 (1890).
The flexibility inherent in this "common law" approach has enabled courts
to apply the Sherman Act to a broad spectrum of business conduct, including
schemes not envisioned by the sponsors of the Act. Although the Sherman Act
was adopted primarily in response to the pernicious activities of the classic
trusts, such as the Standard Oil trust, the tobacco trust, and the sugar trust,
nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended that the Act
be applied solely to such trusts. The Sherman Act subsequently has been applied to a number of business schemes and organizations, including: trade associations, see, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961); medical regulatory associations, see, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); and learned professions, see, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
34. The rule of reason, rooted in the common law, was first applied to
Sherman Act analysis in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In
Standard Oil, the Court decided that the Act, although seemingly absolute on
its face, proscribed only unreasonable restraints of trade. Id. at 63-68. The
Court elaborated on the rule in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231 (1918). See infra note 36. For illustrations of the Court's current approach,
see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975). Under a rule of reason inquiry,
courts do not focus on the reasonableness of a defendant's intentions, the
prices fixed, or the promotion of competition in particular circumstances.
Rather, courts consider a defendant's acts in light of surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the acts are "unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions." NationalSoc'y of ProfessionalEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690.
For a general discussion of the rule of reason, see Adams, The "Rule of Reason'.
Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly?, 63 YALE LJ.348, 348-61 (1954);
Bork, supra note 28; Handler, The Judicial Architects of the Rule of Reason, 5
A.B. SEC. ANTrTRUST 21 (1957).
As a corollary to the rule of reason, certain practices are deemed per se unreasonable when judicial experience has shown them to be inherently anticompetitive and without redeeming virtues. Under the per se rule, courts do not
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principles and policies. 35 Under the rule of reason, all relevant
factors in a particular case are scrutinized in order to weigh the
relative significance of the competition suppressed against any
offsetting procompetitive consequences or purposes. 3 6 No fixed
formula has emerged because slightly differing circumstances
may justify opposite conclusions as to whether a certain activity constitutes a restraint of trade.37 Thus, the common law
inquire into the business purpose or the effect of the practice. In Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), Justice Black offered the following justification for this truncated inquiry:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to
the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for
an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into
the entire history of the industry involved ...
in an effort to determine
at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id.- at 5.
A variety of practices have been labeled as per se violations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market divisions);
KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal
price fixing).
35. See A. STicKELLs, LEGAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS PRACTICES 12-13 (1965).
36. The classic formulation of the rule of reason is:
IT] he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined
by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains ....
The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.).
The Supreme Court has stated that it is a broad rule of proof, not a narrow
theory of agency, that is appropriate under the rule of reason approach: "IT] he
character and effect of a conspiracy is not to be judged by dismembering it and
viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole." United States
v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913). See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962); American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 147 F.2d 93, 106 (6th Cir. 1944), affd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
37. Courts apply the rule of reason to industry standardization programs
of trade associations for claims other than outright collusion and price fixing.
See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (rule
of reason applied to standardization association). See generally Stocking, The
Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the Legality of Trade Association
Activities, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 527 (1954) (thorough review of the leading cases).
For an example of divergent results produced under the rule of reason in
connection with trade associations, compare Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (trade association not engaged in unlawful re-
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contributes flexibility to the interpretation of the Sherman
Act.38
Agency principles were not well developed when the Sherman Act was enacted. The dissenters in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. noted that
"under the laws of agency as known to the Congress that
passed the Sherman Act it was far from clear ... that a princi39
pal could be held liable for the deliberate torts of his agent."
According to an 1889 treatise: "While... it is well settled that
the principal is liable for the negligent act of his agent, committed in the course of his employment, it has been held in many
cases, that he is not liable for the agent's willful or malicious
act."40 Indeed, the Hydrolevel majority read Friedlander v.
straint of commerce) with American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 377 (1921) (trade association engaged in unlawful restraint of
commerce).
38. Congress intended to allow federal courts to develop governing principles of law, in the common law tradition, with regard to the substantive violations of the Sherman Act. In United States v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1956), the Supreme Court declared:
Judicial construction of antitrust legislation has generally been left
unchanged by Congress. This is true of the Rule of Reason. While it is
fair to say that the Rule is imprecise, its application in Sherman Act
litigation, as directed against enhancement of price or throttling of
competition, has given a workable content to antitrust legislation....
It was judicially declared a proper interpretation of the Sherman Act in
1911 ....
Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted).
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court
noted that the common law regarding restraints of trade was dominated by
the dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was
thought would flow from the undue limitation on competitive conditions caused by contracts or other acts of individuals or corporations
[and this fear] led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition or
treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.
Id. at 58. See also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-

46 (1980).

39. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 587 (1982).
40. F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 740 (1889) (footnote
omitted). Mechem elaborated on the rule as follows:
The tendency of modern cases, however, is to attach less importance to the intention of the agent and more to the question whether
the act was done within the scope of the agent's employment; and it is
believed that the true rule may be said to be that the principal is responsible for the wilful or malicious acts of his agent, if they are done
in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority;
but that the principal is not liable for such acts, unless previously expressly authorized, or subsequently ratified, when they are done
outside of the course of the agent's employment, and beyond the scope
of his authority, as where the agent steps aside from his employment
to gratify some personal animosity, or to give vent to some private feeling of his own.
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Texas & Pacific Railway,41 decided in 1889, as holding that "an
employer [is] not liable for the fraud of his agent, when the
employer could derive no benefit from the agent's fraud."42
Thus, it is evident that an apparent authority rule of liability is
inconsistent with the principles of agency law in effect at the
time Congress passed the Sherman Act43 and that Congress
could not have specifically intended to incorporate such a rule
into the antitrust law. Any application of apparent or inherent
authority principles to the antitrust law necessarily involves
the incorporation of common law principles developed since
the passage of the Sherman Act.
H. APPARENT AUTHORITY IN ANTITRUST LAW
A.

APPUCATION OF APPARENT AUTHORITY BY THE FEDERAL

COURTS: THE EARLY CASEs-A RULE OF BENEFIT
AND/OR RATIFICATION

Federal courts in a wide variety of non-antitrust contexts
generally accept a rule favoring imposition of liability upon a
principal for the intentional misdeeds of an agent acting with
apparent authority." Despite the difficulty in justifying the application of such agency principles in Sherman Act analysis, a
number of federal courts have implicitly addressed the issue of
whether apparent authority is an appropriate standard under
the antitrust law. No court, however, has expressly held the apId. (footnotes omitted).
41. 130 U.S. 416 (1889).
42. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
566, 567 (1982). See also id. at 588 (Powell, J., joined by White and Rehnquist,
J.J., dissenting).
43. Further, as the Hydrolevel dissenters noted,
no principle of agency law was more firmly established in 1890-or now
for that matter-than that punitive damages are not awarded against a
principal for the acts of an agent acting only with apparent authority
and without any intention of benefitting the principal. Indeed, this
Court went further, holding more generally that 'punitive or vindictive
damages, or smart money, [are] not to be allowed as against the principal, unless the principal participated in the wrongful act of the agent.'
Id. at 588-89 (quoting Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114
(1893)).
44. See Hydrolevel 456 U.S. at 568 (citing Dark v. United States, 641 F.2d
805 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal tax liability); National Acceptance Co. v. Coal Producers Ass'n, 604 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1979) (common law fraud); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (federal securities fraud); United States v.
Sanchez, 521 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1975) (bail bond fraud), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817
(1976); Gilmore v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1974) (common law fraud); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974)
(federal securities fraud)).
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parent authority theory of liability applicable in an antitrust
context.
The Supreme Court considered this issue in United Mine
Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,45 in which the Coronado Coal
Company sued a labor union under the Sherman Act alleging
concerted activity having an anticompetitive effect on the company's business. Although Coronado is cited primarily for the
proposition that an unincorporated labor union is subject to
suit in federal court,46 the Court also considered "whether the
[union] was shown by any substantial evidence to have initiated, participated in or ratified the interference with plaintiffs'
business."4 7 In its first hearing of the case, Coronado I , the
Court concluded that, absent actual authority or ratification, a
union is not responsible under the antitrust law for the tortious
conduct of its members:
A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its agents in
the course of its business, and this principle is enforced against the
contention that torts are ultra vires of the corporation. But it must be
shown that it is in the business of the corporation. Surely no stricter
rule can be enforced against an unincorporated organization like this.
Here it is not a question of contract or of holding out an appearance of
authority on which some third person acts. It is a mere question of actual agency which. the constitutions of the two bodies settle conclusively. If the International body had interfered or if it had assumed
liability by ratification, different questions would have arisen. 4 8

After a retrial, at which the plaintiffs introduced further evidence showing that the president of the union had directly encouraged the acts complained of, the case again came before
the Supreme Court. In Coronado11,49 the Court remarked that
although such evidence might have sufficed to impose personal
liability on the labor officials involved, it was not sufficient to
impose liability on the union. The Court explicitly held that "it
must be clearly shown in order to impose such a liability on an
association of 450,000 men that what was done was done by
their agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement
of association."5 0
Lower federal courts have also considered the issue of
45. 259 U.S. 344 (1922), affd in part, rev'd in part on reh'g, 268 U.S. 295
(1924).
46. In Coronado I, the Court held that unincorporated associations are
subject to suit under the antitrust laws but that the evidence of the UMW's participation in the conspiracy and the wrongs done was not sufficient to go to the
jury. See id. at 392-96.
47. Id. at 393.
48. Id. at 395.
49. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
50. Id. at 304.
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whether apparent authority is the proper standard for determining the liability of principals under the antitrust law. The
issue was first addressed by the federal District Court for the
District of Maryland in Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.51
The court dismissed an antitrust action brought against a corporate defendant on the ground that the complaint failed to
demonstrate the corporation's liability. The court found that an
employee's conduct that was not intended to benefit the corporation could not be attributed to the corporation. Discussing
the applicability of apparent authority in an antitrust context,
the court stated:
If [the defendant's agents] had improper personal motives and combined to carry them out through the medium of the defendant corporation to the prejudice of the plaintiff, it is conceivable that a common
law tort suit might lie against them; but it is difficult to see how that
would constitute either restraint of
trade or monopoly of trade on the
52
part of the defendant corporation.

In Truck Drivers' Local 421, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,5 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered the propriety of an apparent authority instruction in a case involving an alleged conspiracy to
maintain retail milk prices in violation of the Sherman Act. Relying on Coronado II, the court held that in order to render a
union criminally liable under the Sherman Act for the activities
of its members, "actual and authorized agency was necessary;
mere apparent agency would not be sufficient to take the matter to the jury, unless the circumstances were so strong as competently to support an inference of actual authority."5 4
In Continental Baking Co. v. United States,55 however, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held a corporation legally bound by the unauthorized conduct and statements of its
agents done or made within the scope of their express or apparent authority.56 Notwithstanding Coronado II, the court
held that a corporation is liable for the criminal conduct of an
officer or agent of the corporation acting pursuant to broad express authority who holds a position of responsibility if the
conduct is related to the corporation's business and to the per51. 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937).
52. Id. at 830.
53. 128 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1942).
54. Id. at 235. The Eighth Circuit further stated that it was necessary to
show clearly "'that what was done was done by [the union's] agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement of association."' Id. at 236 (quoting
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 304 (1925)).
55. 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960).
56. Id. at 150.
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formance of the authorized duties of the officer or agent. Although expressly approving a broad apparent authority
instruction, the court arguably sought to limit the scope of the
instruction by requiring that a corporation must "answer for
[an agent's] violations of law which inure to the corporation's
benefit."57
Similarly, in United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,58 the Third Circuit concluded that a corporate defendant was criminally liable under federal antitrust
law for an employee's criminal conduct because the employee
was "motivated at least in part by a desire to serve [the
corporation] ."59
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp.,60 addressed this issue in a criminal antitrust action
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Hilton Hotels involved a business association, comprised in part of hotel operators and hotel supply companies, which was formed to attract
conventions to Portland, Oregon. The association was financed
by contributions from its members. To aid in collecting these
contributions, hotel members of the association gave preferential treatment to suppliers who contributed to the fund. The
Hilton Hotel's managing officer testified that he specifically told
his purchasing agent not to participate in the boycott of noncontributing suppliers.6 1 The purchasing agent nevertheless violated these instructions "because of anger and personal pique
toward the individual representing the supplier."62 The court
held, inter alia, that since the hotel's purchasing agent was authorized to buy all of the hotel's supplies and exercised complete authority as to their source, the hotel was criminally
liable under the Sherman Act for the purchasing agent's conduct. The court further held that where an agent intends to
benefit the principal, the principal may be liable even if it did
57. Id. The Continental court also stated. 'There is evidence in the record
which would justify a determination that their superiors, in fact, adopted and
ratified the acts of the depot managers. If this were so the corporation would
be responsible for such acts, even if they originated in excess of the employee's
authority." Id. at 149.
58. 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
59. Id. at 204. See also United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568
F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir.) ("the actions of the [defendant's] agents were taken
for the purpose of benefiting the corporation"), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978).
60. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
61. Id. at 1004.
62. Id.
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not actually benefit from its agent's conduct. The court observed that
[w]ith such important public interests at stake, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended to impose liability upon business entities
for the acts of those to whom they choose to delegate the conduct of
their affairs, thus stimulating a maximum effort by owners and managers to assure adherence by such agents to the requirements of the
63
Act.

The court, however, went on to limit its holding by noting that
although such an expansive rule of liability is justified in a case
involving a commercial enterprise, because the Sherman Act is
"primarily concerned with the activities of business entitities,"64 a corporation would not be liable if the agent had intended to benefit only itself or another because "[a] purpose to
benefit the corporation is necessary to bring the agent's acts
within the scope of its employment." 65 In sum, the court
stated:
Violations of the Sherman Act are a likely consequence of the pressure
to maximize profits that is commonly imposed by corporate owners
upon managing agents and, in turn, upon lesser employees....
[I]dentification of the particular agents responsible for a Sherman
Act violation is especially difficult, and their conviction and punishment is peculiarly ineffective as a deterrent. At the same time, conviction and punishment of the business entity itself is likely to be both
66
appropriate and effective.

B. A

NEW RULE OF LIABILIry UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAw:
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, INC. V.
HYDROLEVEL CORP.

The Supreme Court, in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,67 examined the appropriateness of an apparent authority standard to resolve the issue of
conspiratorial intent under the Sherman Act. In Hydrolevel, a
63. Id. at 1005 (citing United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126
(1958); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 344 (3d Cir. 1948); United
States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
869 (1946); Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Ill.
284, 303-05, 54 N.E.2d
210, 219-20 (1944); Note, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Acts in Violation of
Company Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547, 558 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note, Corporate Criminal Liability]; Note, Criminal Liability of Corporationsfor Acts of
TheirAgents, 60 H~av. L. REV. 283, 285-86, 289 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Note,
CriminalLiability of Corporations]).
64. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1004. The court buttressed this assertion by
noting that "[t]he statute is directed against 'restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services.'" Id. at 1004-05 (quoting Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940)).
65. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1006 n.4.
66. Id. at 1006.
67. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
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conflict of interest arose when two volunteer members of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)68 were required to interpret boiler standards that affected Hydrolevel, a
competitor of the volunteers' employers. The volunteers inten69
tionally used their positions in the ASME standards program
to drive Hydrolevel out of the boiler fuel cut-off valve business,
thereby ensuring that their employers would remain dominant
in that market 70 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Cir68. ASME is a private, nonprofit, technical and scientific society established for the purpose of enhancing the use of mechanical engineering in the
public interest. It draws its more than 100,000 members from industry, academic, government, insurer, and consumer groups. The organization conducts
educational and research programs, publishes a national magazine and a
number of research journals devoted to mechanical engineering, and, most important to the Hydrolevel controversy, issues and renders interpretations on
over 400 ASME codes and standards designed to improve public safety and promote uniformity. The codes and standards are written, revised, and interpreted
by over 10,000 ASME volunteers. The codes, although merely advisory, have a
powerful economic influence, many being incorporated by reference in federal
regulations and state and local laws. See id. at 559.
69. William Curran describes the pervasive impact of trade standards as
follows:
Trade product standards are an area of our economy familiar to few
consumers. Yet, as is often the case with such backwaters of corporate
activity, trade standards have an enormous impact on our lives. Some
20,000 trade standards at least partly determine the safety, availability,
and price of products ranging from household gas stoves to nuclear reactors. For consumers, trade product standards determine such things
as the length of shoelaces; width of auto tires; ingredients of house
paint; specifications of lawn mowers; sizes of door frames; and design
of child car seats.
Curran, Industrial Standards, Antitrus, and the Logic of Public Action: An
Historical Search for a Rational Public Policy, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 717, 717 n.4
(1978).
70. McDonnell & Miller (M & M), for decades the dominant producer of
low-water boiler fuel cut-off valves, sent a letter to ASME inquiring whether a
low-water fuel cut-off valve with a time delay, which was similar to Hydrolevel's
product, met the requirements of IHG-605 of section IV of ASME's Boiler and
Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code. "Volunteers" T.R. Hardin and John W. James,
chairperson and vice chairperson, respectively, of ASME's section IV subcommittee, cooperated in drafting the M & M letter, which was designed to elicit a
negative response. At the time, M & M employed James as vice president in
charge of research; Hardin was an executive vice president of Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company, the country's leading underwriter of
boiler insurance. In accordance with ASME's standard procedure, Hardin
drafted ASME's response. The secretary of the BPV committee, W. Bradford
Hoyt, adopted and signed this "unofficial" response and sent it to M & M on
ASME stationery.
The ASME response began with an analysis of the purpose of the BPV
Code language at issue and concluded that under the circumstances described
in M & M's inquiry, 'there would be no positive assurance that the boiler water
level would not fall to a dangerous point during a time delay period."
Hydroleve4 446 U.S. at 562. M & M effectively used this interpretation to stifle
the competitive threat posed by HydroleveL
Nine months later, in response to a complaint by Hydrolevel, ASME issued
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cuit's civil antitrust liability judgment,7 1 agreeing that conspiratorial intent could be attributed to ASME from the
unauthorized and collusive exclusionary interpretations of the
two volunteers, because the volunteers were agents acting
under apparent authority. The Court imputed the agents' intent to ASME even though the agents were motivated solely by
private interests. The Court expressly refused to adopt the district court's view 72 that ASME could be held liable only if it had
ratified its agents' conduct or if the agents had acted in pursuit
a new communication expressly countering Hardin's false statements and flatly
asserting that the Code was not intended "to prohibit the use.., of time delays." Id. at 563. Despite this retraction, Hydrolevel's product continued to
meet substantial market resistance.
This series of events formed the basis of Hydrolevel's antitrust action. The
action was originally commenced against three defendants, including ASME,
alleging conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize in violation of § 1 and
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. See supra note 29.
Prior to trial, Hydrolevel settled with M & M and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company for $725,000 and $75,000, respectively. See
Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 124
(2d Cir. 1981), affd, 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
71. Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 578. Before the Second Circuit, the parties disputed the sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict based on the district
court's instruction. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs,
Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1981), afd,456 U.S. 556 (1982). The Second Circuit, without addressing this issue, found that because the district court had
delivered "a charge that was more favorable to the defendant than the law requires," id. at 127, ASME could be held liable if its agents acted within the
scope of their apparent authority. Id. at 124, 127. See infra note 73.
72. The majority explicitly found that the district court's instruction was
inconsistent with the purposes of the antitrust law. The Court reasoned that a
ratification rule "would actually enhance the likelihood that the Society's reputation would be used for anticompetitive ends." Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 573.
Similarly, the Court rejected an intent to benefit requirement noting that organizations such as ASME should be encouraged to eliminate all anticompetitive
practices, "especially [the conduct of agents] who use their positions in ASME
solely for their own benefit or the benefit of their employers." Id. at 574. Moreover, the Court argued that such a requirement would effectively insulate
ASME from liability to the extent that it remained ignorant of its agents' conduct. Id. at 573.
The Court also summarily rejected two additional arguments advanced by
ASME to avoid liability. First, the majority held that case law indicating a hesitancy on the part of courts to impose punitive damages under traditional
agency law is inapposite in instances where a special statute providing for
treble damages exists. Id. at 575-76 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 217 comment c (1957)).
Second, the Court concluded that ASME's status as a nonprofit organization did not insulate it from liability since "it is beyond debate that nonprofit
organizations can be held liable under the antitrust laws." Hydrolevel, 456 U.S.
at 576. Commentators generally agree with this view. See generally Lane,
Trade and ProfessionalAssociations: Ethics and Standards, 46 ANTrrUST L.J.
653 (1977) (discussing activity of trade associations in developing product or
ethical standards); Note, Antitrust and Non-Profit Entities, 94 HAv. L REv. 802
--(1981) (suggesting a framework for application of antitrust law to nonprofit or-
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of ASME's interests, 73 even though the jury found ASME liable
under this standard.74 Instead, the Supreme Court held that a
principal "may be held liable [under the antitrust law] for the
acts of [its] agents even though the organization never ratified,
authorized, or derived any benefit whatsoever from the fraudulent activity of the agent and even though the agent acted
75
solely for his private employer's gain."
The Hydrolevel majority 76 reasoned that its new standard
was proper since the application of general agency principles to
the antitrust law was not inconsistent with congressional intent
that the Sherman Act foster competition. To overcome the
dearth of authority under the antitrust law for holding a principal liable under apparent authority theory, 77 the majority relied
exclusively on the general agency principle that "principals are
liable when their agents act with apparent authority. ' 78 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, found that in order to promote business expediency and to protect the integrity of
ASME's codes, liability must attach under an apparent authorganizations). The Hydrolevel dissent also accepted this view. See Hydrolevel,
456 U.S. at 580.
73. Hydrolevel requested that the trial court instruct the jury that ASME
could be held liable under the antitrust law for its agent's conduct if the agents
had acted within the scope of their apparent authority. The district court, however, rejected this approach and instead, at ASME's suggestion, charged the
jury that ASME could be held liable only if it had ratified its agent's conduct or
if the agents had acted in pursuit of ASME's interests. The jury returned a verdict for Hydrolevel in the amount of $3.3 million. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American
Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 456 U.S.
556 (1982).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment on liability, but concluded that the district court's instructions did not accurately reflect agency and antitrust law. The Second Circuit concluded that ASME
should be held liable if its agents acted within the scope of their apparent authority. The court remanded the case after finding that the district court miscalculated Hydrolevel's damages. Id. at 128. The district court opinion by
Judge Weinstein is unpublished. The case came before the Supreme Court on
a writ of certiorari.
74. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 573.
75. Id. at 579 (Powell, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
After finding that ASME had violated the Sherman Act under its new rule of
liability, the Court proceeded to assess treble damages. See supra note 30.
76. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Chief Justice Burger filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented, strongly
criticizing the majority's "unprecedented theory of antitrust liability,"
Hydroleve 456 U.S. at 578, disputing the majority's authorities, and criticizing
their reasoning. See infra notes 84, 86, 92, 93, 96, 109.
77. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 570 n.7.
78. Id. at 565-66.
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ity theory.79 Noting that in the past the Court had refused to
constrict antitrust rights of action by resort to common law barriers,80 and that Congress intended that "'the private action
'81
will be an ever-present threat' to deter antitrust violations,"
Justice Blackmun found no inconsistency between apparent
authority theory and the intent behind the antitrust law of encouraging competition. Justice Blackmun reasoned that a rule
imposing liability most faithfully adhered to the congressional
intent of fostering competition 82 because ASME's interpretations of its standards might "'result in economic prosperity or
economic failure, for a number of businesses of all sizes
throughout the country,' as well as entire segments of an
industry."

83

The Court expressly declined to limit the boundaries of the
antitrust liability of an organization for conduct of an agent acting under apparent authority. The Court concluded its opinion
by stating: "We thus make it less likely that competitive challengers like Hydrolevel will be hindered by agents of organizations like ASME in the future."
IIl. AN ANALYSIS OF HYDROLEVEL: THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF APPARENT AUTHORITY
IN ANTITRUST LAW
The Hydrolevel decision exemplifies the inappropriateness
of the apparent authority standard for measuring a principal's
79. Id. at 567. The Court noted that the apparent authority theory was well
established in the federal system in a wide variety of areas. See cases cited
supra note 44. The Court further asserted that "few doctrines of the law are
more firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions of social
policy than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own."
Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 568 (quoting Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U.S.
349, 356 (1929)).
80. Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 569.
81. Id. (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968)).
82. Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 572-73.
83. Id. at 570 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1981, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1968)).
But see infra note 86. The Court buttressed this assertion by illustrating the
great power wielded by ASME and the great potential for anticompetitive activity arising from the influence of ASME's codes and standards. Hydroleve 456
U.S. at 571. Specifically, the Court stated that holding ASME liable would promote competition because "[o]nly ASME can take systematic steps to make
[anticompetitive activity] on the part of all its agents unlikely, and the possibility of civil liability will inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME to take
those steps." Id. at 572.
84. Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 578. The dissent condemned the Court for imposing treble damage liability without regard for the potential costs, and for
failing to delineate the limits of its decision. See id. at 593-94.
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antitrust liability for its agent's unauthorized conduct. The
Court's expansive rule of liability is unwarranted in light of the
nature of standard-setting organizations 5 and the public benefits these organizations provide. 86 Although ASME was prop85. The procedure for responding to requests for interpretation, clarification, or guidance concerning the technical requirements or language of a standard must be distinguished from the procedure for certifying that a specific
product complies with the relevant standards. The Second Circuit failed to
comprehend this distinction, declaring- "Absent some internal review procedures, no individual should be empowered to rule dispositively on the fitness of
a competitor's product. When an organization has placed a person in a position
to do what Hardin did, without any check or supervision, it must bear the consequences." Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc., 635
F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1981), affld, 456 U.S. 556 (1982). Although the Supreme
Court apparently was cognizant of this distinction, the majority seemingly
overestimated ASME's power to affect the destinies of businesses or to frustrate competition. See supra text accompanying note 83. A formal certification
process is normally handled by an independent body, such as a testing laboratory, rather than by the body responsible for the development of standards.
The certification process allows manufacturers to attest that their products satisfy the applicable standards. For an overview of the certification process, see
Howe & Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit Certification Organizations: Conflicts of Interest and a PracticalRule of Reason Approach to Certification Programsas Industry-Wide Builders of Competition and Efficiency, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 357, 362-74 (1982). It would be illogical for officials of the related
companies using boiler fuel cut-off valves to contend that they lacked knowledge of this distinction. Most of these officials would understand that the "mischievous" interpretation resulted from a request for guidance rather than from
a request for certification that Hydrolevel's valves complied with ASME's standards. The impact of ASME's interpretation should have been tempered in
light of this important distinction between regulation and technical advice. Although recognition of this distinction does not implicate the Court's findings regarding the anticompetitive effects of ASME's conduct, it does place in
question the Court's perception that an expansive rule of liability was necessary to control such a powerful organization. See Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 570.
86. Subjecting standard-setting organizations to an increased risk of antitrust treble damages liability raises a number of serious public policy issues.
Organizations such as ASME provide numerous economic benefits for the public which the Hydrolevel majority failed to consider. Such programs facilitate
market entry by: expediting the process of consumer acceptance of new products; reducing consumer prices by promotion of production cost efficiencies; increasing quality control; maximizing well-informed purchasing decisions;
promoting product interchangeability; serving as a channel for spreading product innovation; deterring frivolous product differentiation; maximizing competition; and providing an opportunity and a role for the effective expression of
public interest. For a detailed discussion of how such programs promote these
ends as well as others, see Howe & Badger, supra note 85, at 376-81.
Subjecting standard-setting organizations to treble damages liability is inappropriate because it will have a chilling effect on the beneficial activities enumerated above. Moreover, in holding ASME liable the Court apparently
ignored the purpose of the antitrust law-to prevent businesses from engaging
in anticompetitive practices. See United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 467 F.2d
1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). See also
supra text accompanying notes 60-66. Although the effect of the Hydrolevel
majority's rule may be minimal, under the loosely defined concept of apparent
authority, nonprofit organizations will potentially be subject to innumerable an-
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erly held accountable in Hydrolevel,8 7 because it effectively
titrust suits. Under the Court's new rule, standard-setting organizations may
even be susceptible to suits by industries attempting to rid themselves of the
burdens imposed by these organizations. The commitment of time and resources necessary to install additional procedures and to litigate claims of anticompetitive practices will undoubtedly affect the activities of these
organizations. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute of Building Sciences in Support of the Petition for Certiorari at 7-8, American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (twenty-two
amicus briefs filed by other standard-setting organizations also made this
point). The liability standard adopted by the Court requires standard-setting
organizations to take such additional measures by effectively making them insurers of all the acts of their volunteer committee members. Budgetary and organizational constraints, however, preclude the kind of pervasive supervision
necessary to minimize the risk of antitrust liability. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that additional review procedures, no matter how well conceived, can effectively combat the situation where volunteers actively conspire to deceive an organization to the benefit of their employer. See Hydrolevel 456 U.S. at 591-92
n.17 (Powell, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). Thus, by imposing a significantly greater antitrust risk, the Court undermines the usefulness of standard-setting organizations. Concomitantly, the Court discourages
participation in such organizations because a more stringent standard of liability increases the likelihood that participants will be drawn into antitrust conspiracies.
Although the Hydrolevel majority adequately described the position of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency with respect to the application of agency principles when treble damages are at issue under a federal statute, see supra note
72, the Hydrolevel facts illustrate the necessity of an exemption from or limitation to these principles.
In the event of a total retreat from the field of standard setting by private
organizations, government assumption of these tasks is not a promising prospect. The government's ability to attract a comparable number of persons of
the same level of competence is questionable. Even if the government could
attract such employees, the cost to society would be significantly increased.
Government participation in the development of standards promises additional
"red tape," and consequently, additional cost to industry, and ultimately to consumers. This result appears anomalous in light of the current trend toward reducing the impact of regulation on industry.
87. Requiring organizations such as ASME to account for the conduct of
their agents will induce greater care by principals to prevent misconduct by
agents occupying especially sensitive or responsible positions. At the very
least, the possibility of civil liability will have a prophylactic effect since such
organizations will be compelled to take systematic steps to guarantee the propriety of their agents' conduct. In this respect, it is difficult to refute the
Court's assertion that imposing liability on organizations such as ASME will
benefit the public by promoting business expediency and by giving reasonable
protection to third parties dealing with agents. See Howe & Badger, supra note
85, at 388-90 (describing internal safeguards that may be implemented by standard-setting or certification organizations). As the Hydrolevel majority noted,
ASME was in the best position to protect against future misinterpretations of
its codes. Hydrolevei 456 U.S. at 576. Indeed, the Court observed that ASME
had already initiated new procedures to protect against future antitrust liability. Id. at 576-77 n.15. More sophisticated control mechanisms, however, are not
talismanic. Although pervasive review procedures may prevent mistakes made
in good faith on behalf of an organization, no safeguards can completely protect
against fraud or disloyalty. For example, in Hydrolevel, absent either credible
grounds to suspect that the original M & M request was contrived, or
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ratified its agents' conduct,88 the Court could have accomplished this result 9 by employing a much narrower holding.90
With a narrower holding the Court could have achieved a result
consistent with general agency principles and furthered antitrust enforcement while avoiding the horrors the majority perceived in such a rule.9 '
By approving an apparent authority criterion, the
Hydrolevel Court adopted an exceptional standard that has no
logical or practical application to the antitrust law. The main
shortcoming is that such an apparent authority/vicarious liability standard creates a strict liability standard of conspiratorial
intent under the antitrust law. 92 Such an approach is clearly
improper. 93 Imposing liability for unintentional participation in
an antitrust conspiracy is inconsistent with accepted principles
of antitrust law. Courts in civil and criminal antitrust actions
consistently have held that in order to establish a conspiracy
the evidence must permit an inference that the alleged conspirknowledge of the complicity of the ASME subcommittee, no set of procedural
safeguards would have prevented the conspirators' deceptive scheme.
88. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
89. The Court's conclusion on the issue of liability is particularly appropriate in the context of standard-setting organizations. Such organizations are rife
with opportunities for anticompetitive activities since potential conflicts of interests are an innate characteristic of organizations that draw their volunteers
from the industries that they regulate. See Howe & Badger, supra note 85, at
373. It is apparent that less-than-altruistic "volunteers" could attempt to improperly use such an organization and its reputation as a means to protect or
advance the economic interests of their employers. Thus, a rule imposing liability is commendable. In the context of both general business organizations
and standard-setting organizations, principals must be encouraged to monitor
and to control the "power" their agents possess. A rule imposing treble damages liability based upon negligence, however, seems to subvert this motivation. See supra note 86.
90. See infra notes 112-36 and accompanying text. See also supra note 84.
91. See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
92. The distinction between strict and vicarious liability is critical. Strict
liability requires proof that the defendant engaged in the necessary acts or
omissions without regard to the defendant's mens rea. Vicarious liability, in
contrast, requires proof of the defendant's mens rea, without regard to whether
the defendant personally engaged in the necessary acts or omissions.
In light of this distinction, it is evident that the Hydrolevel Court applied a
per se standard of strict liability to ASME. See supra note 72. This approach is
inconsistent with the long-established principle that standard-setting activities
are to be scrutinized under the more permissive rule of reason standard. See
supra note 37.
The Hydrolevel minority argued that the expansive rule of "strict liability"
proclaimed by the Court was "inconsistent with the weight of precedent and
the intent of Congress, unsupported by the rules of agency law that the Court
purports to apply, and irrelevant to the achievement of the goals of the antitrust laws." Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 579.
93. See Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 584-89.
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ators had "a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds." 94 Although the
volunteers in Hydrolevel acted solely for the benefit of their
employers and against the interest of ASME, the adoption of an
apparent authority standard compelled the Court to find conspiratorial intent on the part of ASME. In addition to subverting accepted tenets of antitrust law, the Court invites
advancements in the law of antitrust conspiracy that may stifle
fair combinations that do not restrain trade-a result that is an95
tithetical to the objectives of the antitrust law.
The apparent authority theory is also inconsistent with the
purposes of civil liability under the antitrust law, which extend
well beyond the mere compensation of victims, as demonstrated by the Clayton Act's provision for treble damages.
Courts have repeatedly recognized three additional purposes
served by the treble damages provision: (1) to halt existing violations by encouraging private enforcement; (2) to punish past
violations; and (3) to deter future violations. 96 Because civil
94. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d
Cir. 1980) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810
(1946)). The Supreme Court has expressly held that intent is a necessary element of a criminal antitrust violation. United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978). It is essential that a defendant's state of mind or
intent be conclusively established "by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom." Id. Thus, the Court has previously been unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strict liablility criminal offenses. The
Gypsum Court, however, went on to state that "a civil violation can be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect." Id.
at 436 n.13 (citing United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969)).
The Court, however, emphasized the limited nature of this principle: "In a conspiracy, two different types of intent are generally required-the basic intent to
agree, which is necessary to establish the existence of the conspiracy, and the
more traditional intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy. Our discussion here focuses only on the second type of intent." Id. at 443 n.20 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). Indeed, Gypsum clearly involved a naked agreement. Similarly, Container Corp. involved an express agreement among competitors to exchange information on prices. See United States v. Container
Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Hydrolevel, in contrast, involved the sufficiency of evidence of intent in the context of a conspiracy. Thus, Gypsum provides no support for a conclusion that participation in an antitrust conspiracy
can be based exclusively on the unauthorized, disloyal conduct of agents who
intend to benefit only themselves or a third party. See Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies,57 WASH. L. REv. 1, 45 (1981). See also Note,
Developments in the Law---Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAxv. I REv. 920, 1000
n.611 (1958) (courts fail to distinguish between civil and criminal cases in discussing liability for antitrust conspiracy).
95. For example, the apparent authority standard threatens the existence
of standard-setting organizations. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text. The rule of reason, however, permits reasonable combinations in restraint
of trade. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
96. Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 575. The Hydrolevel dissent noted that "[tihe

1983] APPARENT AUTHORITY ANTITRUST LIABILITY

461

antitrust actions serve essentially the same purposes as criminal actions, civil actions have the same intent requirement. 97 A
civil antitrust violation involves more than a normal civil tort
action; it is clearly inappropriate to use an apparent authority
theory in civil antitrust actions. Agency doctrines were developed solely to determine which party bears the loss resulting
from an agent's fraud, and concomitantly, to compensate the

victim.9 8
Furthermore, the Hydrolevel decision is impractical. The
Court failed to address the question of how an organization can
ever avoid a finding of conspiratorial intent based on an agent's
unauthorized conduct. The decision injects uncertainty into
the management of a business organization, for no guidance is
given except the vague mandate to provide appropriate safeguards.9 9 Also, in light of the threat of a treble damages award
in civil antitrust actions, application of the Hydrolevel approach
to an organization that has merely been negligent in failing to
stop a renegade agent's unauthorized conduct creates a substantial danger of overdeterrence.10o This can only be considered a tragic and confusing development for all business

organizations.
After erroneously concluding that apparent authority thevery idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct." Id. at 583 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981)).
97. See supra note 94.
98. See supra notes 4-27 and accompanying text. Moreover, punitive damages normally are not predicated on an apparent authority holding. Even in
the antitrust context, which the Restatement (Second) of Agency treats as an
exception, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, courts previously used apparent authority as a basis for treble damages only when they found benefit or
ratification. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying text. Because benefit or
ratification is no longer a required element of apparent authority in civil antitrust actions, however, the continued vitality of the Restatement view is questionable in this context.
99. See Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 572.
100. There is no right to contribution among antitrust wrongdoers. In Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), the Court concluded
that Congress neither expressly nor implicitly intended to create a right to contribution and that the federal courts were not empowered to fashion such a federal common law rule. Specifically, the Court stated:
The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and
to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of
wrongdoers. The absence of any reference to contribution in the legislative history or of any possibility that Congress was concerned with
softening the blow on joint wrongdoers in this setting makes examination of other factors unnecessary.
Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted). See also Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 593 n.19 (Powell, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (nonprofit organizations
cannot deduct treble-damages liability as business expense).
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ory is appropriate in an antitrust context, the Court compounded its error by misapplying the theory. Regardle~s of the
propriety of applying apparent authority principles to antitrust
law,101 the ASME volunteers in Hydrolevel acted in an unauthorized manner,102 thus precluding liability based on a proper
application of apparent authority doctrine.103 The requisite
conduct whereby a principal creates apparent authority is noticeably absent without a requirement of ratification by the
principal at or near the time of the unauthorized conduct.104
The facts presented in Hydrolevel were more conducive to
analysis under an inherent agency power theory. 0 5 Under
such an analysis, ASME would be required to answer for the
conduct of its volunteers because that conduct fell within the
powers inherent in ASME's grant of authority.106 By predicating its new rule on an improper foundation, the Court adds disorder to confusion. Even if the inherent agency power theory
had been applied, however, the question persists whether
treble damages are appropriate, that is, whether such liability
is consistent with the rationale behind an inherent agency
power doctrine.107
Moreover, regardless of the propriety of the Court's new
rule, the decision to develop it in the factual context presented
in Hydrolevel was unfortunate. Subsequent courts may easily
avoid this rule, in an attempt to escape the assessment of
treble damages, by noting that the jury originally found ASME
liable on a narrow benefit/ratification theory. As Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence implies, future courts may regard as dictum the opinions of the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court.108
Finally, the majority's failure to discuss decisions that ap101. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. Whether liability would
be appropriate under such an analysis, however, is questionable. See infra
notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 123-28, 144-47, and accompanying text.
108. Chief Justice Burger advocated affirmation based upon the district
court's theory of liability. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Burger
noted that
the Court of Appeals did not rest on the narrow ratification theory underlying the District Court judgment, but instead reached out to decide
that petitioner is liable for the acts of its members if those acts are
found to be within their apparent authority: the jury never found liability on that theory and the Court of Appeals went 'out of bounds.' I
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pear to reject antitrust liability based on "apparent authority"
is troublesome.109 In a footnote, the majority disingenuously
stated that "a fair reading of those cases ... reveals that they

did not directly discuss the merits of an apparent authority theory of antitrust liability."" 0 Such cursory treatment, however,

was unwarranted and of questionable validity."1 In a decision
announcing a far-reaching new theory of antitrust liability, a

thorough discussion of those cases purporting to consider the
appropriateness of apparent authority in an antitrust context is
essential to the integrity of the Court's decision. At the very
least, such a discussion would better define the circumstances
in which the new rule should be applied. The following proposal is designed to answer many of the questions remaining after Hydrolevel and to thus inject certainty and reason into the
determination of a principal's liability under the antitrust law

for the unauthorized conduct of an agent.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO AN APPARENT AUTHORITY
STANDARD IN ANTITRUST LAW
The Supreme Court, in Hydrolevel, overlooked many alterregard that aspect of the Court of Appeals' opinion today as dictum not
essential to support the result reached.
Hydroleve 456 U.S. at 578-79 n.*.
109. Justice Powell's dissent directed attention to the majority's failure to
point to any antitrust case in which a court had held the apparent authority
theory of liability applicable, or in which a principal had been subject to trebledamages liability as a result of the conduct of an agent acting without any intention of benefiting its principal. Hydrolevel 456 U.S. at 581. Powell found this
to be a major flaw, because the Court had, on previous occasions, refused to impose antitrust liability in the absence of clear evidence showing ratification or
actual authority. Id. (citing Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268
U.S. 295 (1925); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922)).
Powell also noted that in the context of commercial enterprises, "the Courts of
Appeals that have considered the matter appear to reject antitrust liability
upon mere apparent authority." Id. at 581-82 (citing United States v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903
(1978); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied sub nom, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator
& Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948
(1971)).
110. Hydrolevei 456 U.S. at 570 n.7.
111. The majority implied that Truck Drivers' Local 421, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 128 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1942), addressed the merits of the
application of apparent authority theory in antitrust law. Hydroleve, 456 U.S.
at 570 n.7. The majority, however, rejected the minority's interpretation of
Hilton Hotels, Continental Baking, American Radiator, and Cadillac Overall
Supply, asserting that a "fair reading" of these cases revealed that an apparent
authority theory of antitrust liability had not been passed upon. See supra
notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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native, narrow holdings,112 choosing instead to proclaim an expansive rule of liability that is inappropriate in antitrust law.
This Note recommends a possible modification in the standard
for determining a principal's liability for an agent's unauthorized and anticompetitive conduct. This alternative is more
practical and more compatible with accepted tenets of antitrust
law than the apparent authority approach espoused in
Hydrolevel."3 The proposal is not a radical innovation; rather,
it is a coherent application of existing theories of liability. The
three-pronged test set out below achieves a flexible and rational approach and results in just determinations while avoiding the broad rule of liability established in Hydrolevel.
The three-pronged test involves a sequence of questions;
each question must be answered in the negative for the principal to avoid liability. The questions may be summarized as follows: (1) Did the agent have inherent authority?; (2) Did the
principal benefit from or ratify the agent's conduct?; and (3)
Was the principal negligent in controlling the agent's conduct?

A.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Two preliminary considerations must be addressed in each
case before applying the proposed test. These considerations
involve situational variations that require modification or limitation of the test.
The first consideration involves the distinction between
civil and criminal actions. Although the proposed test is primarily intended to be applied in civil antitrust suits, it is easily
adaptable to criminal actions. In adapting the test, however,
three principles of vicarious criminal liability need to be taken
into account."14 The first is the penalty to be assessed. To the
extent that vicarious liability is justified under the antitrust
law, it should not be used to bring about the type of moral condemnation inherent in a sentence of imprisonment." 5 Second,
112. Hydroleve 456 U.S. at 573.
113. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
114. A basic tenet of Anglo-American criminal justice is that criminal sanctions are inappropriate absent personal fault on the part of the accused. The
continued vitality of this fundamental restraint on the use of criminal sanctions
is threatened by a rule that uniformly imposes vicarious liability on a principal
for all the criminal conduct of its agents. See generally Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 63 (discussing criminal liability of corporations for
conduct of their agents); Note, CriminalLiability of Corporations,supra note
63 (same).
115. On the other hand, imposition of a fine is consistent with the rationale
behind vicarious criminal liability. Vicarious liability is imposed because of the
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vicarious criminal liability should be limited to situations
where the agent who performs or participates in the criminal
activity is sufficiently high in the principal's organizational hierarchy to make it reasonable to assume that the agent's conduct reflects the policy of the principal." 6 Finally, as is
universally accepted and required in cases of vicarious corporate criminal liability,"n7 'the criminal [conduct must be] directly related to the performance of the duties which the agent
*. . has the broad authority to perform."" 8 In addition, the
conduct must be committed with the "intention to perform it as
a part of or incident to a service on account of which [the
agent] is employed."" 9 Criminal liability under this test is not
predicated on the principal receiving an actual benefit from the
agent's criminal conduct.120 Acts undertaken solely to advance
the agent's own interests or the interests of parties other than
the employer, however, should not subject a principal to criminal liability.12'
The second preliminary consideration involves the agent's
actual authority to engage in the conduct in question. Although
this consideration may appear superfluous, it is important to
point out that the proposed test is applicable only when the
agent acts without actual authority. In the presence of actual
authority, liability should attach as a result of the direct agency
relationship.122
B.

THE THREE-PRONGED TEST

The three-pronged test's first component, generically entitled "inherent authority," is an approach foreshadowed by the
nature and inherent danger of certain business activities and the difficulties of
establishing actual fault in the operation of such businesses. A fine, unlike imprisonment, is a proper penalty for a business enterprise. See generally Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARv. L REV. 689 (1930)
(discussing vicarious criminal liability).
116. See, e.g., People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E.
455 (1928); Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 63 (discussing
cases); Note, CriminalLiability of Corporations, supra note 63 (same).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
118. Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir.

1960).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1957).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d
905, 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
121. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir.
1962).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1957).
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Sixth Circuit in ContinentalBaking Co. v. United States.123 In
Continental Baking, the court analyzed several criminal cases
in which corporations were held responsible for the conduct of
their officers-authorized and unauthorized-and found a
"common denominator."1 24 Each of the cases shared three attributes: (1) the officer or agent of the corporation had broad
express authority; (2) the officer or agent had committed a
criminal act related to the corporate business; and (3) the criminal act was related to the performance of duties that the officer
or agent had broad authority to perform.125 The court concluded that a corporation that employs a person with broad authority commensurate with responsibility cannot contend that
the person was authorized to act only legally.12 6 Borrowing
from this principle, the inherent authority standard imposes
civil liability upon principals for the illegal conduct of "high
managerial agents" related to the principal's business even
without the principal's knowledge, ratification, or benefit.
The extent of such liability must be circumscribed by the
nature of the agent's position and the extent of actual authority
the position entails. In this regard, the following definition of
high managerial agent should provide guidance: A high managerial agent is any agent of a principal having duties of such responsibility that the agent's conduct may be fairly assumed to
represent the policy of the corporation or principal. 12 7 This definition includes, but is not limited to, corporate officers.128 The
definition, however, is not as broad as it appears. In defining
high managerial agents, courts should look to the rationale for
imposing liability on principals for the conduct of such agents;
a high managerial agent's responsibilities are so broad that it
would be extremely difficult for third parties dealing with such
agents to discern their true authority.
If the answer to the first prong is negative, courts should
determine whether liability is justified under the second
prong-benefit/ratification. This prong derives from antitrust
cases suggesting that an organization is liable for the unauthor123.

281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960). See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying

text.
124. ContinentalBaking Co., 281 F.2d at 149.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 150.
127. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1) (c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (corporation liable for offense committed by "high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment").
128. For example, the president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary
would be considered high managerial agents, but this list is not exclusive.
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ized conduct of an agent if it ratified the agent's conduct or if
the agent's conduct was in pursuit of the organization's interest.129 Case law supports imposition of a rebuttable presumption of benefit/ratification,130 but the existence of factors such
as due diligence in the maintenance of safeguards or net
financial detriment to the organization should be held sufficient
to overcome the presumption. The benefit/ratification standard
comports with the common notion of conspiratorial intent
32
under the Sherman Act131 and has worked well in practice.1
Moreover, it prevents imposition of treble damages where an
agent has circumvented an organization's well-conceived
33
safeguards.
Finally, the third prong of the test prevents a principal
from avoiding liability solely by claiming ignorance of an
agent's conduct. By using a negligence standard, imposing a
duty to provide sufficient safeguards, and focusing on compensatory rather than punitive damages, courts can complement
the preceding two prongs of the test. As a complementary theory based in common law, the third prong does not entail expansive new rules that occasion significant departures from
prior case law.'3 Rather, it serves to fill a "loophole." Imposing compensatory damages for simple negligence liability
avoids the horrors that the Hydrolevel majority sought to
avoid;135 under the third prong, ASME could not have avoided
all liability by remaining ignorant of its agents' fraud. 36 Thus,
the third prong of the proposed test avoids the harshness of
treble damages where a defendant was only "negligently conspiratorial." Moreover, by employing this "gap-filler" courts
can accomplish the twin goals of compensating injured plain129. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied sub nom., 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. See also Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137
(6th Cir. 1960); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. See generally Whiting, Antitrust and the CorporateExecutive, 47 VA L. REV. 929, 933-35 (1961) (discussing
conspiratorial liability for antitrust violations); Note, supra note 94 (thorough
discussion of criminal conspiracy).
132. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text. Indeed, the jury in
Hydrolevel found ASME liable under such an instruction. American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 564-65 (1982).
133. See supra note 87.
134. See Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 830 (D. Md.
1937); supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
135. Hydroleve4 456 U.S. at 573.
136. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
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tiffs and providing organizations with an incentive to implement safeguards.
C. APLiCATION OF THE THREE-PRONGED TEST
Three hypothetical situations, with facts drawn from the
Hilton Hotels137 and Hydrolevel cases, illustrate the operation
of the three-pronged test.
A variation of the facts in Hilton Hotels illustrates the application of the first prong. As noted above, in Hilton Hotels,138
notwithstanding the principal's explicit instructions to the contrary, a purchasing agent boycotted suppliers who did not contribute to a Portland convention association.139 For purposes of
illustrating the first prong, however, it will be assumed that the
area manager of the hotel boycotted suppliers contrary to a resolution of Hilton's board of directors. Given these facts, it
would be reasonable to presume that the manager's actions
represented the policy of the Portland Hilton, even though the
manager acted outside the scope of his or her actual authority
and acted exclusively for personal benefit. If, as assumed here,
the area manager was one of the highest ranking officers at the
Portland Hilton, the high managerial agent requirement would
be met. Moreover, given the broad express authority vested in
the office of area manager, it would be extremely difficult for
any third person to ascertain the manager's actual authority to
represent company policy with respect to the boycott. Consequently, the company should be required to respond for its
manager's actions notwithstanding the board's contrary resolution, the board's failure to ratify the agent's action, or the
agent's subjective intent to benefit only himself or herself.
Applying the three-pronged test to the facts actually
presented in Hilton Hotels, it would be difficult to conclude that
the purchasing agent was a high managerial agent whose actions represented the policy of the corporation. 40 Although the
purchasing agent was authorized to buy all the hotel's supplies
and exercised complete authority as to their source, this indicates, at most, the agent's power to determine the company's
narrow policies concerning procurement of supplies, not the
137. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cerat
denied sub nom., 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
138. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
139. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1002.
140. The holding in Hilton Hotels comports with the criminal limitation of
the proposed three-pronged test. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying
text.
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agent's authority to determine the policy regarding participation in a boycott.141 The company's policy regarding the hotel's
participation in a boycott could be ascertained from statements
or conduct of high ranking officials specifically empowered to
state the company's policy; it is fallacious, however, to assert
that a third party would rely on the purchasing agent's conduct
as indicative of company policy with respect to boycotts. 142 Because no "high managerial agent" is involved, the first component is negated, and evaluation under the second prong of the
test is necessary. This prong prompts an inquiry into any benefit to, or ratification by, the principal. The principal in Hilton
Hotels apparently did not ratify the purchasing agent's conduct
since the manager of Hilton's Portland hotel expressly instructed the agent not to participate in the boycott.143 A purpose to benefit the corporation, however, is plausible because
the intended effect of the association's boycott was to increase
convention business. Indeed, given the evidentiary presumption of intent to benefit the principal and the absence of evidence of safeguards commensurate with the risk of
unauthorized conduct by an agent, and of resultant financial
detriment to the principal, the principal would be liable under
the second prong of the proposed test. This result is justifiable
in that it would stimulate efforts to ensure an agent's adherence to the law; even if the corporation did not actually receive
the benefit, it should be responsible for prevention because the
agent intended that the corporation benefit.
The facts presented in Hydrolevel illustrate the third prong
of the proposed test and demonstrate that the district court
reached a correct and rational determination. The first prong of
the test is inapplicable because the volunteer workers were not
high managerial agents. It is unlikely that the volunteer
agents' unofficial determination of acceptability, drafted solely
by these agents, would be properly considered a declaration of
141. Although the decision to participate in the boycott arguably was within
the agent's authority to determine the source of supplies, the purpose of the
boycott-to force financial support of the Portland convention association-was
clearly a policy matter beyond the authority of the purchasing agent.
142. This type of extension of the high managerial agent test is unwarranted. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28. If, however, the evidence in
a particular case indicates that a principal has delegated official responsibilities
to agents below the high managerial agent level, and this practice is commonly
known, the court should not mechanically apply the test. Instead, the court
should focus on the function delegated rather than on the agent's official position in the organizational hierarchy.
143. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1004.
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ASME's policy. Thus, the first prong inquiry yields a negative
response.
The benefit/ratification prong appears to be the precise basis of the district court's decision in Hydrolevel.144 Indeed, the
jury found ASME liable under a benefit/ratification instruction.145 The jury determination appears warranted since ASME
did little to repudiate the conduct of its volunteer agents and in
fact initially adopted the agents' response, which was distributed on ASME letterhead. 4 6
Even if the jury had not found benefit to, or ratification by,
the principal, ASME could still have been subjected to liability
under the third prong. If ASME breached its duty to maintain
adequate safeguards, as it appears it did because the evidence
demonstrated the ready availability of procedures to protect
against such improper conduct by volunteers, 47 the organization would be required to compensate any victims.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Hydrolevel, established a rule of vicarious liability that, for all practical purposes, holds an organization strictly liable under the Sherman Act for the
unauthorized conduct of its agents. This decision portends an
enormous overload in litigation for both business and nonprofit
organizations, which for years have relied upon well-founded
and useful agency principles. Such time-honored principles
should be abandoned only to the extent necessary to protect
the general welfare. The Court, however, went far beyond this
point. It considered neither the merits of its expansive new
theory nor the potentially crippling effect of the treble damages
sanction. The result advocated by the Court can be reached
through less imposing methods. This Note proposes a flexible
method for determining the antitrust liability of a principal for
the unauthorized and anticompetitive conduct of its agents.
But until the Court or Congress considers it appropriate to review the Hydrolevel standard, all organizations should be on
notice that they are subject to treble damages liability under
144. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 564-65 (1982).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 561-64.
147. See id. at 576-77 n.15. This evidence would not be admissible in an action for negligence. See FED. R. EvD. 407. Nevertheless, since ASME had
failed to implement any safeguards, the evidence would still support a verdict
for the Hydrolevel plaintiff.
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the Sherman Act for unintentional participation in the illegal
and unauthorized conduct of their agents.
Philip T. Colton

